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Abstract
Provision of most public goods (e.g., health care, library services, education, utili-
ties) can be characterised by a two-stage ￿ production￿process. The ￿rst stage translates
basic inputs (e.g., labour and capital) into service potential (e.g., opening hours), while
the second stage describes how these programmatic inputs are transformed into ob-
served outputs (e.g., school outcomes, library circulation). While the latter stage is best
analysed in a supply-demand framework, particularly in the former stage one would
like to have e¢ cient public production. Hence, unlike previous work on public sector
e¢ ciency (which often con￿ ates both ￿ production￿stages), this paper analyses how po-
litical economy factors shape e¢ cient public good provision in stage one (using local
public libraries as our centre of attention). To do so, we use a specially tailored, fully
non-parametric e¢ ciency model. The model is rooted in popular Data Envelopment
Analysis models, but allows for both outlying observations and heterogeneity (i.e., a
conditional e¢ ciency model). Using an exceptionally rich dataset comprising all 290
Flemish public libraries, our ￿ndings suggest that the ideological stance of the local
government, the wealth and density of the local population and the source of library
funding (i.e., local funding versus intergovernmental transfers) are crucial determinants
of library e¢ ciency.
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11 Introduction
Economic e¢ ciency ￿understood in terms of providing a maximum amount of output for
a given level of inputs (e.g., Koopmans, 1951; Fried et al., 2008) ￿is often considered an
important requirement for private ￿rms. Minimizing ine¢ ciency increases the performance
and pro￿tability of ￿rms and, thus, bene￿ts shareholders. In recent years, increasing attention
has also been paid to e¢ ciency requirements in the public sector (e.g., Lindblad, 2006). The
reason is that, while needs are high, "budget constraints ensure that there is only so much
money available" (Chen, 1997, 71).1 The strongly increased importance of e¢ ciency in the
public sector leads to the question what determines e¢ cient public good provision. Why
are some jurisdictions or public service providers able to o⁄er more (or better) services than
others using an equal amount of inputs?
We are clearly not the ￿rst to study public sector e¢ ciency (see De Borger and Kerstens,
2000, for a review). Numerous studies have previously taken up this issue both with respect
to particular areas of public good provision (e.g., waste collection, police services, road main-
tenance, and so on; see Kalseth and Rattsł, 1998; De Borger and Kerstens, 2000) and general
assessments of public performance (e.g., Vanden Eeckaut et al., 1993; De Borger et al., 1994;
Geys, 2006; Balaguer-Coll et al., 2007; Borge et al., 2008; Geys et al., 2008). Nonetheless,
we di⁄er from previous work in three important respects.
First, we start from the view that many public services - such as health care, education,
libraries - require active involvement by the recipient of the service in the delivery of this
service. For example, demand for library services to a large extent drives the observable
￿ output￿of libraries ￿in terms of circulation of books or audiovisual materials, and in-house
use of materials. As a result, ￿the amount of service delivered is, to some extent, beyond the
control of the provider￿(Hammond, 2002, 650). This, however, implies that the observable
output (e.g., library circulation) cannot really be employed as an ￿ output￿indicator in studies
of productive e¢ ciency, as it is in a strict sense not really ￿ produced￿by the public service
provider. In fact, this argument implies that public good provision can be characterised by a
two-stage ￿ production￿process (adapted from Hammond, 2002, 2005). In the ￿rst stage, basic
inputs ￿such as (expenditures on) labour and capital ￿are employed for producing ￿service
potential￿￿such as collection size and opening hours (in the case of public libraries). In a
second stage, these ￿programmatic inputs￿(Vitaliano, 1998) are transformed into observable
outputs ￿such as book circulation and request processing. Whereas most previous work
ignores this speci￿c nature of the public good production process and focuses on the second
1The existence of such e¢ ciency requirement obviously does not imply that e¢ ciency takes, or should take,
precedence over other aims of public service provision. As in the private sector, e¢ ciency should be viewed
as one among many aims; including e⁄ectiveness, equity, responsiveness, adequateness and appropriateness
(Dunn, 2004).
2stage, or analyses some hybrid of both stages (see Section 2 below), we explicitly focus on the
￿rst stage of this production process. In our view, this is a more appropriate environment
for e¢ ciency analysis because e¢ ciency can here easily be understood as translating a given
amount of public expenditures into a maximum possible amount of service potential (whereas
the second stage is more appropriately analysed in a supply-demand framework).
As a second contribution, we employ a recently developed fully non-parametric frame-
work. The non-parametric nature of the model derives from the di¢ culty - if not impossibility
- to argue that the public good production process follows one or another functional form.
Therefore, throughout the paper, we do not make any a priori assumption on the produc-
tion technology. While our approach is in this respect closely related to Data Envelopment
Analysis (DEA) models (Charnes et al., 1978; Deprins et al., 1984), it is more advanced than
traditional DEA by allowing for outliers (following the order-m technique of Cazals et al.,
2002) and heterogeneity. We tackle the latter by using the conditional e¢ ciency estimators
of Daraio and Simar (2005, 2007). As the conditional e¢ ciency estimates do not require a
separability condition (i.e., the assumption that the exogenous environment does not in￿ u-
ence the level of inputs and outputs), it is particularly convenient in the current application.
The ￿nal model is based on De Witte and Kortelainen (2008), who extended Daraio and
Simar (2005, 2007) to allow for (1) both discrete and continuous exogenous variables and (2)
statistical inference in the conditional e¢ ciency approach. As such, besides reducing the im-
pact of outliers and controlling for heterogeneity, we are able to non-parametrically evaluate
the in￿ uence of exogenous characteristics on the service potential of public good providers.
The latter constitutes our third contribution. Previous studies generally fail to evaluate
how the institutional environment ￿ in terms of socio-demographic, economic or political
characteristics ￿a⁄ects e¢ ciency, or look at this via a two-stage approach (e.g., Worthing-
ton, 1999; Hemmeter, 2006). Both exclusion from the model of such background factors
and their use in a two-stage approach, however, lead to biased results and incorrect infer-
ences (see Battese and Coelli, 1995; Stevens, 2004 and Kumbhakar et al., 1991; Reifschneider
and Stevenson, 1991). In this paper, we include, using the above-mentioned non-parametric
conditional e¢ ciency model, the operational environment immediately in the e¢ ciency es-
timates. We thereby concentrate on the following elements: (1) ideological stance of the
local government, (2) share of women in the local council, (3) wealth of the municipality, (4)
population concentration, and (5) source of public funding.
While our view on public good production as a two-stage production process is applica-
ble to a wider range of public goods, our empirical application concentrates on local public
libraries. We thereby exploit an exceptionally rich data set of all 290 Flemish public li-
braries in 2007. Studying Flemish public libraries is particularly attractive for our purpose
since in Flanders political actors have signi￿cant in￿ uence on the day-to-day running of the
3library. Therefore, this creates a best-case scenario to evaluate the potential impact of po-
litical economy indicators. Our central ￿ndings suggest that the ideological stance of the
local government, the wealth and density of the local population and the source of library
funding (i.e., local funding versus intergovernmental transfers) are signi￿cant determinants
of an e¢ cient generation of ￿ service potential￿ . At odds with recent work on the e⁄ect of fe-
male representation (Pande, 2003; Chattopadhyay and Du￿ o, 2004; Geys and Revelli, 2009;
Svaleryd, 2009), the number of women in the local government (or the presence of a female
mayor) does not add to the explanatory power of the model, ceteris paribus.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the foregoing
literature on library e¢ ciency estimation. Then, in Section 3, we describe the theoretical
background and main hypotheses. Section 4 introduces the estimation methodology, while
Section 5 presents the institutional setting and data employed in the present study. Our main
￿ndings are brought together in Section 6. Finally, the main conclusions are summarized in
Section 7.
2 Literature review
Libraries, whether run by local governments or universities, have a very speci￿c and important
task. They provide access to information. Usually, however, they have to manage this with a
limited budget. These budgets have recently also shown a tendency to decrease rather than
increase. This holds both for public and academic libraries (e.g., Shim and Kantor, 1998;
Hammond, 2002). As a result, the measurement and determinants of library e¢ ciency have
received increasing attention in the literature. Two related, though distinct, approaches have
thereby been employed. (1) In early work, scholars were predominantly interested in scale
e¢ ciency of libraries by analysing whether libraries are operating under increasing, constant
or decreasing returns to scale (e.g., Goddard, 1973; Cooper, 1979; DeBoer, 1992; Hammond,
1999; Ikeuchi, 2001; Liu, 2003; for an early review, see Van House, 1984). The question
addressed here is whether provision is taking place at an optimal scale of production, or
whether there exists a possibly ￿substantial potential for a reduction in costs￿by altering
the scale of provision (Hammond, 1999, 288). (2) Since the mid 1990s, scholars have taken a
more general approach and started assessing whether libraries provide a maximum amount
of output for a given level of inputs (e.g., Chen, 1997; Vitaliano, 1997, 1998; Shim and
Kantor, 1998; Sharma et al., 1999; Worthington, 1999; Kao and Liu, 2000; Hammond, 2002,
2005; Shim, 2003; Kao and Lin, 2004; Chen et al., 2005; Hemmeter, 2006; Reichmann and
Sommersguter-Reichmann, 2006; Liu and Chuang, 2009; for a review, see Shim, 2003).
Consider ￿rst the results of the scale economies approach. There initially appeared little
consensus among researchers. While an early study on US public libraries by Goddard (1973)
4reveals the existence of economies of scale, Cooper (1979) demonstrates constant returns to
scale in US library production and Feldstein (1976) even ￿nds signi￿cant diseconomies of
scale (though this study excluded small libraries). These contrasting ￿ndings led Van House
(1984) to conclude that evidence is, at best, ambiguous. More recent results, however, using
more advanced methodologies, converge towards increasing rather than decreasing returns to
scale in library service provision. For example, DeBoer (1992) ￿analysing 194 Indiana public
libraries in 1988 ￿￿nds that scale economies exist for small libraries, while larger ones exhibit
constant returns to scale. He thereby suggests that Feldstein￿ s (1976) diverging ￿ndings may
have been driven by the exclusion of small libraries. Hammond (1999), replicating DeBoer
(1992) for 152 UK public library systems in 1995/96 and extending it by considering multiple
outputs, likewise ￿nds signi￿cant increasing returns to scale in library services.2 Finally,
analyzing 89 US academic research libraries in 1999/2000, Liu (2003) also concludes that
economies of scale exist.
While providing one means to assess whether libraries are working at an optimal scale,
the ￿ scale economies￿approach does not allow assessing the overall productive (or technical)
e¢ ciency of libraries. That is, one cannot assess whether inputs are used in the best possible
way. The latter question has been the subject of a second group of studies starting o⁄ with
the doctoral research of Easun (1992) and reviewed in Shim (2003). While a large variety
of countries, settings (i.e., public, university and school libraries) and de￿nitions of libraries￿
inputs and outputs have been employed, most studies have relied on Data Envelopment
Analysis (DEA) as their main statistical tool (the only three exceptions being Vitaliano, 1997;
Hammond, 2005 and Hemmeter, 2006). While all studies ￿nd signi￿cant ine¢ ciencies, little
consensus exists as to what causes these ine¢ ciencies.3 Vitaliano (1998) - using a sample of
184 public libraries in New York - shows e¢ ciency is higher in larger cities and that excessive
opening hours are the main cause of observed ine¢ ciencies. Hammond (2002) - looking at
99 multi-outlet UK public library systems in 1995/96 - does not ￿nd any e⁄ect of excessive
opening hours, but rather attributes ine¢ ciency to oversubscription to periodicals. Likewise,
while Vitaliano (1997) - for a sample of 235 libraries (including branches) in New York -
shows that non-pro￿t libraries are more e¢ cient than government-run ones, Hemmeter (2006)
contradicts this ￿ndings in an analysis of 3308 US library systems over the period 1994-2001.
Interestingly, however, the latter study also illustrates that a larger share of library income
coming from local sources increases e¢ ciency (especially for small libraries), suggesting that
￿local government can play an important monitoring role among public libraries￿(Hemmeter,
2Interestingly, cost complementarities among the various library outputs (i.e. economies of scope) appear
to be absent.
3Whereas the remaining discussion revolves around public libraries, studies on university and academic
research libraries include Chen (1997), Shim and Kantor (1998), Kao and Liu (2000), Shim (2003), Kao and
Lin (2004), Reichmann and Sommersguter-Reichmann (2006) and Liu and Chuang (2009).
52006, 345).
In our view, two important problems confront this large literature. First, most of these
studies fail to control for non-discretionary factors a⁄ecting library e¢ ciency, or look at
this via a two-stage approach (e.g., Worthington, 1999; Hemmeter, 2006). As mentioned
above, both lead to biased results and incorrect inferences. Given the crucial importance to
incorporate controls for exogenous factors in the analysis, we exploit a novel non-parametric
approach that allows incorporating the operational environment immediately in the e¢ ciency
estimates. Second, all the above-mentioned studies tend to rely on observable outputs (most
often library circulation data) as their output measure. As argued above - and returned to
more extensively below - this cannot really be employed as an ￿ output￿indicator in studies
of productive e¢ ciency, as it is not really ￿ produced￿in a strict sense by the public service
provider. That is, observed output is to some extent beyond the control of the provider since
it is also a⁄ected by public demand. Our analysis starts from a clear view of the public
good production function, and concentrates on that part of the ￿ production￿process where
the public service provider has full control over the transformation of inputs into outputs
(de￿ned in more detail below).
3 Theoretical background and hypotheses
Essentially, we view the public good production process as being characterised by a two-
stage ￿ production￿process (adapted from Hammond, 2002, 2005). In a ￿rst stage, basic
inputs ￿ such as (expenditures on) labour and capital ￿ are employed in the production
of what could be described as ￿ service potential￿(Bookstein, 1981; Hammond, 2002). For
public libraries (the focus of our empirical analysis below), one can think of collection size and
opening hours.4 In the second stage, these ￿ programmatic inputs￿(cf. Vitaliano, 1998) are
then transformed into observable outputs (such as book circulation and request processing).
Clearly, however, the ￿nally observed amount of public service ￿ output￿from this second
stage depends on an active involvement by the recipient of the service in its delivery. That
is, the ￿ outcome￿of the latter stage is not solely determined by the public service provider,
but also depends to an important extent on the demand that lives in a given area for the
services provided. Recognizing this is crucially important when evaluating the e¢ ciency of
public service provision.
In evaluating e¢ cient public good provision, our analysis below concentrates on the ￿rst
stage of the above-described production process for two related reasons. Firstly, this stage
is the most appropriate environment for e¢ ciency analysis. Speci￿cally, as the second stage
4While we focus on library e¢ ciency in the analysis, the same argumentation can be made for other types
of public services (e.g., education, health care, water services, waste collection).
6of the production process relies at least in part on demand for public services, incorporating
it into the e¢ ciency analysis can lead to strongly biased inferences. For example, when
observed library circulation (i.e., the ￿nal ￿ output￿ ) is low, a relatively high-cost library will
appear very ine¢ cient when using circulation as the output variable in the analysis. Yet, it
may at the same time be very e¢ cient in translating its basic inputs into service potential. If
so, using circulation as an output measure will lead it to be unduly punished simply because
it su⁄ers from low demand in its area.5 Focussing on the ￿rst stage of the public production
process avoids this bias. Secondly, and more speci￿c to the case of libraries studied here,
it might be argued that libraries are not there to maximize circulation of books, but rather
to maximize access to the reading materials and information sources it contains. In such
understanding of the prime task of libraries, library e¢ ciency relates to maximization of
￿ service potential￿ , given the budget constraint, rather than library circulation (i.e., the ￿rst
stage of the above-described production process).
Crucially, the extent to which this aim is achieved depends on the institutional (i.e., polit-
ical, socio-demographic as well as ￿nancial) environment in which public service providers (in
this case, public libraries) operate. Firstly, the political environment could matter because
(1) right-wing parties and (2) male politicians might have di⁄erent priorities in running a
local library compared to, respectively, left-wing governments and female politicians. This
prediction follows from a large political economy literature stating that ideology determines
politicians￿policy preferences (e.g., Hibbs, 1977; Tavares, 2004), as well as from more recent
evidence indicating that gender is an important indicator of policy preferences (e.g., Lott
and Kenny, 1999; Edlund and Pande, 2002; Funk and Gathmann, 2008) and determines
policy outcomes (e.g., Pande, 2003; Chattopadhyay and Du￿ o, 2004; Geys and Revelli, 2009;
Svaleryd, 2009). Speci￿cally, this literature suggests that the latter groups - i.e. left-wing
and female politicians - tend to be more egalitarian and socially conscious. Translated to the
present setting, this implies that left-wing and female politicians might be more inclined to
focus on the ￿ non-economic￿bene￿ts of libraries (supplying the opportunity to read for the
less well-o⁄, getting the population to read more extensively, and so on), thereby putting
more pressure on local public libraries to maximize their service potential (given the lim-
ited budget).6 The political environment may be particularly important in our setting (i.e.,
Flanders). Indeed, political actors have signi￿cant in￿ uence on the day-to-day running of
the library since opening hours, budgets, sta¢ ng, and so on all need to be approved by the
5This is not to say that high-cost libraries should be placed in low-demand areas. Clearly, this would be
a waste of public resources. Rather, the argument is that, from a purely e¢ ciency perspective, this library
should be recognized as being e¢ cient - and not be punished for an element beyond its control (i.e., public
demand for its service).
6Clearly, they might also wish to increase the budget, but the crucial point here is that, for a given budget,
they are more likely to push for higher service potential.
7local council. This yields a ￿rst hypothesis:
H1: Library e¢ ciency is higher when a) the ideological stance of the local government is
left-wing and b) the share of women in the local council is higher.
The municipal socio-demographic make-up is likely to a⁄ect library e¢ ciency through its
in￿ uence on the demand and willingness to pay for cultural goods. Indeed, demand and will-
ingness to pay for such goods generally rise with income (e.g., Pommerehne, 1982; Throsby,
1994; Schulze and Ursprung, 1998; Getzner, 2004), such that high-income residents ￿may
constitute a special interest group striving for cultural provisions￿(Werck et al., 2008, 47; cf.
Mueller and Murrell, 1986). They may therefore pressure local public libraries to maximize
their service potential given the budgetary constraints. Related, distance is often argued to
play a crucial role in deciding whether or not to visit a cultural event (see, e.g., Verhoe⁄,
1992; Bille Hansen, 1997; Boter et al., 2005; De Graa⁄ et al., 2007). High concentration of
population, by reducing the average cost of travelling to the library, thus increases the group
of potential users of the library￿ s services. As such, for a given population size, urban areas
(which are more densely populated) may have a larger share of its population interested in
and striving for the e¢ cient provision of cultural goods (in this case, library services). More-
over, lower travel costs can be argued to increase the ￿ option value￿of library services.7 This
leads to our second hypothesis:
H2: Library e¢ ciency is higher in a) wealthier and b) densely populated areas.
Finally, we know from standard principal-agent theory (e.g., Alchian and Demsetz, 1972;
Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Holmstr￿m, 1979; La⁄ont and Tirole, 1986) that monitoring is
likely to reduce information asymmetries between principal and agent. Indeed, this literature
shows that under perfect monitoring a ￿rst-best solution can still be reached. In other words,
there is a strong disciplining e⁄ect of monitoring that - by limiting possibilities for wasteful
spending and rent extraction by the agent - is strictly welfare-improving (Alchian and Dem-
setz, 1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Holmstr￿m, 1979; Frey, 1993).8 Monitoring, however,
is likely to be higher when a larger share of library spending derives from local sources (i.e.,
fees and municipal subsidies) rather than subsidies from higher-level governments. The rea-
son lies in a form of ￿scal illusion, whereby an imperfect mapping of consumers and ￿nanciers
of library services reduces the incentive to act as e¢ ciency guards. It is, after all, other peo-
ple￿ s money that is being wasted. Applying this line of argument to our setting, libraries
7This follows from applying standard option pricing theory. Speci￿cally, a decrease in the ￿ strike price￿of
an option (e.g., through lower travel costs) to acquire a given underlying commodity (i.e., library services)
increases its value.
8Recent experimental evidence is generally supportive of such a disciplining e⁄ect of monitoring (e.g.,
Nagin et al., 2002; Dickinson and Villeval, 2008).
8are ￿more likely to value the careful use of public money when it originates mainly from own
revenue sources rather than external transfers￿(Geys et al., 2008, 3). This gives our third
and ￿nal hypothesis (cf. Hemmeter, 2006):
H3: Library e¢ ciency is higher when resources derive to a larger extent from own revenues.
4 Empirical methodology
To estimate e¢ ciency in the ￿rst stage of the library production process and to determine
its politico-economy in￿ uences (which are in the remainder considered as exogenous from the
library￿ s point of view), we could in principle employ several modelling techniques. However,
a closer look at the data and hypotheses limits the possibilities. First, we should focus on a
non-parametric model as there is no a priori information on the appropriate production tech-
nology for public services (e.g., libraries). In other words, we have no reason to believe that
the relationship between the inputs, outputs and exogenous characteristics follows a speci￿c
functional form (e.g., Cobb-Douglas, Translog, Fourier, ...). Although non-parametric mod-
els have a lower rate of convergence, they have been shown to be more consistent compared
to wrongly speci￿ed parametric models (Kneip et al., 1998). Second, as we have no informa-
tion on price variables, we have to rely on a branch of non-parametric models particularly
designed for public performance analysis: Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA; Charnes et al.,
1978) and Free Disposal Hull (FDH; Deprins et al., 1984). Finally, given that we want to
control for heterogeneity and test for the in￿ uence of the exogenous environment on library
e¢ ciency, the choice of modelling techniques is further narrowed to conditional e¢ ciency
estimators (Daraio and Simar, 2005, 2007) and, in particular, conditional e¢ ciency models
that allow for discrete and continuous exogenous variables (De Witte and Kortelainen, 2008).
The model starts from the set ￿n of observed combinations of inputs x (x 2 R
p
+) and
outputs y (y 2 R
q





+ j x can produce y
￿
: To determine the e¢ ciency of the eval-
uated libraries, we start from the best practice observations, i.e., the libraries that are using
the least inputs x for a given amount of outputs y (this is the so-called input-orientation; for
alternative orientations, see Fried et al., 2008). These best practice observations constitute
the best practice frontier, i.e., the border of the production technology ￿: The ine¢ ciency ￿
of the evaluated entity (x;y) is estimated as the distance to the best practice frontier:
￿(x;y) = inf f￿ j (￿x;y) 2 ￿g (1)
where the input e¢ ciency measure ￿(x;y) ￿ 1 is the proportionate decrease of inputs, which
the library operating at level (x;y) should attain in order to be considered ￿ e¢ cient￿(i.e.,
￿(x;y) = 1).
9Two options now arise. One could impose convexity on the production possibilities (as in
DEA) or not (as in FDH). Not imposing convexity clearly implies a more general approach.
Moreover, there are ￿no valid theoretical arguments for assuming a priori that production
possibilities are truly convex￿(Cherchye et al., 2000, 263-264) and some empirical studies
suggest violations of the convexity hypothesis (e.g., Hasenkamp, 1976). Hence, as there is no
clear justi￿cation in our application to estimate a convex hull around the data, we concentrate





+ j y ￿ yi;x ￿ xi;(xi;yi) 2 ￿n
￿
: (2)
The FDH estimator for the Farrell input-oriented e¢ ciency score is obtained by replacing ￿
with ^ ￿ in equation (1).
However, a major disadvantage of the traditional non-parametric FDH model is that all
n observations in the sample ￿n are considered to be potential best practices: Prob((x;y)
￿ ￿) = 1. Therefore, atypical observations (e.g., due to measurement errors, very atypical
structure of the entity, etc.) heavily in￿ uence the best practice frontier and, as a direct result,
the e¢ ciency scores. To reduce the in￿ uence of these atypical observations, we follow Cazals
et al. (2002) in estimating the FDH e¢ ciency of equation (1) relative to a partial frontier
constituting of m < n observations. By repeatedly drawing (B times) with replacement a
subset of m observations among those xi such that yi ￿ y and averaging the e¢ ciency scores
relative to these B subsets, we obtain a robust e¢ ciency estimate ￿
m(x;y). The robust
estimates ￿
m(x;y) are no longer bounded by 1 as the evaluated observation is not always
included in the reference set. These ￿ super-e¢ cient￿e¢ ciency scores (i.e., if ￿
m(x;y) < 1)
indicate that the observation is using less inputs than the average m evaluated observations
in its reference set. As such, the super-e¢ cient observation is doing better than what would
be expected.9
The robust e¢ ciency approach of Cazals et al. (2002) proves extremely convenient to
incorporate the exogenous environment. Traditional non-parametric models su⁄er from a
separability condition in that the operational environment is assumed not to in￿ uence the in-
puts and outputs. However, in real life applications, this is clearly unrealistic. The conditional
e¢ ciency approach, developed by Cazals et al. (2002) and Daraio and Simar (2005, 2007),
allows to incorporate the exogenous environment. Basically, while using the robust e¢ ciency
model described above, the idea is to draw the subsample of size m in such a way that simi-
lar observations have a higher probability of being drawn. Hence, the resulting ￿ conditional￿
e¢ ciency estimates ￿
m(x;y j z) compare like with likes. As the seminal contributions did not
allow for multivariate analysis of both discrete and continuous exogenous variables, De Witte
9Following the literature (e.g., Daraio and Simar, 2007), we select the size of the partial frontier m as the
value of m from which on the percentage of super-e¢ cient observations in only decreasing marginally with
m. In our application, this corresponds to m = 50. (whereas n = 290, see below).
10and Kortelainen (2008) extended the approach. Basically, their approach uses mixed (i.e.,
both discrete and continuous) Kernel smoothing around the exogenous variables such that
for every observation the probability of being similar to the evaluated observation is known.
A second advantage of the De Witte and Kortelainen (2008) extension - crucial for our
analysis - arises from the possibility for statistical inference concerning the in￿ uence of the
exogenous variables. This extents the original contributions of Daraio and Simar (2005),
which allowed for a graphical inference on the e⁄ect of exogenous variables (i.e., favorable
or unfavorable), to estimating a non-parametric p-value (using an on bootstrapping based
approach). Similar as in Daraio and Simar (2005, 2007), the procedure is implemented by
estimating the e⁄ect of the exogenous variables on the ratio of the conditional ￿
m(x;y j z)
to the unconditional ￿
m(x;y) e¢ ciency. Indeed, if an exogenous variable has an unfavorable
e⁄ect on performance, then ￿
m(x;y j z) (i.e., e¢ ciency when taking z into account) will be
larger than the unconditional e¢ ciency ￿
m(x;y) for large values of z (compared to small val-
ues of z; see Daraio and Simar, 2007). Non-parametrically bootstrapping this non-parametric
regression allows us to obtain statistical inference (in particular, p-values).
5 Institutional setting and data
We are able to exploit an exceptionally rich data set including information on all 290 lo-
cal public libraries in Flanders in the year 2007. These data derive from the Department
￿ Social Development and Local Cultural Policy￿(Afdeling Volksontwikkeling en Lokaal Cul-
tuurbeleid) of the Flemish Regional government. They collect - and make publicly available
- information on library revenues (e.g., subsidies and fees), expenditures (on personnel, in-
frastructure, library collection maintenance), collection size (e.g., books, CDs, DVDs, and so
on) and operations (i.e., circulation, requests, public readings, and so on) since 1998. We em-
ploy the most recent data available (i.e., 2007) as a change in the data collection methodology
in 2006 makes the resulting data imperfectly comparable across time. Data on opening hours
are, unfortunately not centrally collected and have been brought together by contacting the
libraries themselves.
Given that DEA-based approaches - as the one employed here - tend to be sensitive to
the number of inputs and outputs included (inclusion of more inputs and outputs strongly
increases the number of e¢ cient observations), we opt for three input and four output vari-
ables measuring local public library service potential. As inputs, we use expenditures on
(1) personnel, (2) operating expenditures (Opex; mainly maintenance of the collection) and
(3) infrastructure. The ￿ basic￿inputs are used to provide (1) youth books, (2) ￿ction and
non-￿ction books and (3) other media (cd, dvd, vhs, cd-rom) during a given number of hours
per week. Hence, we use these three collection-related variables as indicators of library ser-
11vice potential. As a fourth output, we also include the total number of opening hours per
week, as this proxies the actual accessibility of the library collection for potential borrowers.
Descriptive statistics of the employed variables are presented in Table 1.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for 2007
Average St. Dev Min Max
Inputs
Personnel 366539 474973 52914 4698859
Opex 70725 80184 5897 609432
Infrastructure 66827 217529 103 1794090
Outputs
Opening hours 24 10 10 51
Youth books 25120 20800 4602 161986
Fiction and non-￿ction books 40852 38909 6806 285218
Media 33455 59187 0 523144
Operational environment
Female mayor 0.093 0.291 0 1
ICG 5.022 0.727 2.500 6.300
Percentage female in council 0.336 0.078 0.080 0.600
Income 12.930 1.390 9.547 17.536
Population 19780 20034 2337 235143
Population density 527 427 62 3053
Subsidies Flanders 0,833 0,102 0,165 0,979
As mentioned in Section 3, the exogenous institutional environment may heavily in￿ u-
ence library performance, particularly in Flanders where the municipal council has signi￿cant
in￿ uence on the daily management of the public library. To evaluate the three hypotheses
derived in Section 3, we examine the e⁄ects of the (1) ideological stance of the local govern-
ment, (2) share of women in the local council, (3) wealth of the municipality, (4) population
concentration, and (5) source of public funding. These are measured as follows:
Firstly, we measure the Ideological Complexion of the local Government (ICG) as ICG =
Pn
i=1 (pi:Complexioni), where pi is the seat share of party i in the College of Mayor and
Aldermen (i.e., the local government) and ￿ Complexion￿refers to the ideological position of
this party on a Left-Right scale (from 0 to 10). The data concerning a party￿ s ideological
position were obtained from Rihoux (2001) and are based on a self-placement survey asking
presidents and spokesmen of the parties in the municipalities to locate their party on an
ideological scale between 0 (Left) and 10 (Right). The ￿gures range from 2.6 (Groen!) to 6.0
(Open VLD) (the extreme-right-wing party Vlaams Belang was not represented in any local
12government and is therefore not in the data set). As a higher ICG score represents more a
right-wing government, we expect an unfavorable e⁄ect on e¢ ciency.
Secondly, to measure the in￿ uence of female representation, we use two operationali-
sations. The ￿rst measures female representation as the share of female members in the
municipal council (the local parliament). The more women are elected into the council, the
more likely it is that female preferences are translated into actual policies. The second oper-
ationalisation attempts to gather whether female preferences are more likely to come about
when there is a female mayor. In this case, we de￿ne female representation using an indicator
variable equal to 1 when the mayor is female, 0 otherwise. Following Hypothesis 1, we expect
women to be a force in favour of library e¢ ciency.
Thirdly, real taxable per capita income (in e1000) is included to assess whether e¢ ciency
is higher in wealthier municipalities (driven by the idea that the well-o⁄ may constitute a
special-interest group). Population density (measured as inhabitants per km2) is taken up as
a measure for the degree of urbanisation. Testing Hypothesis 2, we expect a favorable e⁄ect
to e¢ ciency from an increasing population density.
Finally, libraries are a heavily subsidized public service in Flanders. A large share of
these subsidies derives from the Flemish Regional government. These constitute no less than
72% of total library revenues on average. The remaining income is provided by municipal
subsidies (roughly 11% of the budget on average) and various alternative resources such as
membership fees (3%), borrowing fees (5%) and ￿nes (5%). We include the share of regional
subsidies in the total library budget to evaluate the third hypothesis, i.e. whether e¢ ciency
is higher (lower) when resources derive to a larger extent from own revenues (higher-level
government subsidies).
6 Results
The results of the e¢ ciency estimations are summarized in Table 2. In column 1, we present
the results when we do not account for the exogenous environment (i.e., ￿ unconditional￿
e¢ ciency). We ￿nd an average e¢ ciency score of 0.79. This indicates that, on average,
Flemish local public libraries would have to decrease their inputs by approximately 21% in
order to produce their outputs equally e¢ ciently as the best practices. There is, however,
a very large disparity in the performance across libraries, as can be seen from the sizeable
standard deviation around this average ine¢ ciency. Moreover, some e¢ ciency scores are
signi￿cantly larger than 1 (i.e., ￿
m(x;y) < 1). Hence, some observations can be viewed
as super-e¢ cient: they perform better than the average m observations in their reference
sample.
To examine Hypotheses 1 to 3, we develop ￿ve alternative conditional e¢ ciency models. In
13a ￿rst model (referred to as Model 1), we examine the in￿ uence of ideological stance, share of
female politicians in the local council, average income, and population concentration. Model
2 adds population size to this baseline model, in order to check whether the population
concentration e⁄ect not merely derives from a larger population as such. Model 3 adds a
dummy variable for female mayors to assess whether this ads an independent e⁄ect on public
library e¢ ciency, once controlling for overall female representation in the local council (as in
Model 1). To test Hypothesis 3, we develop a fourth model which includes the percentage of
regional subsidies in total library revenues, while controlling for the ideological preferences
of the municipality (in Model 4) and average income (Model 5).
Once we account for the exogenous environment (i.e., conditional e¢ ciency), our earlier
conclusions change in two important ways (results summarized in columns 2 to 6 of Table 2
for Models 1 to 5). First, the average e¢ ciency score no longer deviates from 1, suggesting
that the average local public library in Flanders provides its service potential e¢ ciently.
Second, the standard deviation around this mean reduces signi￿cantly. This indicates that a
large part of the variation in ine¢ ciency, which was observed in the unconditional e¢ ciency
estimates, is due to failing to account for exogenous factors. Both ￿ndings thus strongly
support the importance of accounting for exogenous factors when evaluating public sector
e¢ ciency.
These summarized results, however, do not allow us to evaluate Hypothesis 1-3. Rather
than concentrating on the raw e¢ ciency estimations, it is therefore more interesting to con-
sider the in￿ uence of the political economy variables on the e¢ ciency scores. We represent
the full estimation results for all ￿ve conditional models in Table 3. Before discussing these
results, recall that, in an input-oriented framework, a positive e⁄ect on the median indicates
an unfavorable e⁄ect on e¢ ciency, while a negative e⁄ect on the median indicates a favorable
e⁄ect on e¢ ciency.10
Our results provide strong evidence in line with the ￿rst part of our ￿rst hypothesis. That
is, right wing councils are associated with a statistically signi￿cant reduction in public library
e¢ ciency, ceteris paribus. This ￿nding is robust to all speci￿cations, and suggests that left-
wing governments are indeed more likely to care about maximising library service potential
(under a given budget). The second half of our ￿rst hypothesis is not supported. That
is, although the share of female representatives in the local council has a positive e⁄ect on
median e¢ ciency - in line with expectations - this fails to be statistically signi￿cant. A similar
conclusion is reached when examining the in￿ uence of a female mayor on e¢ ciency (Model 3).
Female mayors are not associated with a signi￿cant increase in library performance, ceteris
10We consider the e⁄ect on the median, rather than the mean, as the former is less in￿uenced by extreme
values. Note also that, due to the structure of the non-parametric bootstrap, we only present whether the
exogenous variable has a signi￿cant (un)favorable e⁄ect to e¢ ciency. The marginal coe¢ cient on the median
is less meaningful (see De Witte and Kortelainen, 2008).
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We ￿nd strong support for Hypothesis 2. Municipalities with higher income and urbani-
sation levels (i.e., more densely populated) have better performing libraries. The latter e⁄ect
is not driven by population size. Indeed, when including population size in the estimation
(Model 2), this turns out to be insigni￿cant, while the e⁄ect of population concentration
remains una⁄ected.
Finally, our results con￿rm Hypothesis 3. Libraries turn out to have a higher service
potential when library revenues derive to a larger extent from local resources (i.e., municipal
subsidies, fees and ￿nes). This con￿rms the idea that monitoring has a strong and positive
e⁄ect on local public good provision, and that incentives for monitoring are undermined
when a larger share of income derives from higher-level government subsidies. This supports
Hemmeter￿ s (2006) ￿ndings for a sample of 3308 US library systems (see Section 2). It
also con￿rms recent ￿ndings by Geys et al. (2008), who show that involvement of voters
in local public a⁄airs (e.g., through turnout in elections) mainly enhances local government
e¢ ciency when local governments have higher ￿scal autonomy. When a larger share of local
revenues comes from intergovernmental subsidies, "the e¢ ciency-enhancing e⁄ect of voter
involvement" is signi￿cantly reduced (Geys et al., 2008, 1).
Table 2: Order-m e¢ ciency score
Unconditional Conditional
(robust FDH) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Average 0.7892 1.0507 0.9891 1.0078 1.1082 1.0096
St. Dev. 0.6575 0.1946 0.1294 0.1606 0.2394 0.2029
Min 0.1965 0.5315 0.4778 0.5061 0.5018 0.5019
Max 5.4843 2.4027 2.0493 2.4284 2.0760 2.0093
As an alternative to the bootstrapped p-values presented in Table 3, we can also present
the results graphically. As these might be more easily accessible than the results in Table
3, we plot the results from Model 5 in Figure 1. In particular, we follow Daraio and Simar
(2005, 2007) by non-parametrically regressing the ratio of the conditional and unconditional
e¢ ciency measure Qz =
￿
m(x;yjz)
￿m(x;y) on environmental factor z. Given that we have a multivari-
ate framework, we examine partial regression plots (Badin et al., 2008), where the evaluated
variable (i.e., share of Regional subsidies in total library revenue) changes and the other vari-
ables are kept at a ￿xed value (i.e., their mean). The result clearly illustrates the negative
11One potential explanation for this non-￿nding might be that municipalities with high female representa-
tion also tend to have more left-wing governments (assuming women are more likely to run - and be elected
- on left-wing party lists). This, however, does not appear to be supported by the data. Indeed, while we do
￿nd the expected negative correlation between ICG and fcouncil, this relation is weak (r=-0.1140; p=0.07).
15Table 3: In￿ uence of the exogenous environment on service potential of libraries
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
e⁄ect on median p-value e⁄ect on median p-value e⁄ect on median p-value
ICG unfavorable <2E-16 *** unfavorable <2E-16 *** unfavorable <2E-16 ***
fcouncil favorable 0.2350 favorable 0.3720 unfavorable 0.5400
income favorable 0.025 ** favorable <2E-16 *** favorable 0.02 **
popconc favorable 0.09 * favorable <2E-16 *** favorable 0.01 ***
population favorable 0.8300
fmayor unfavorable 0.1700
Model 4 Model 5
e⁄ect on median p-value e⁄ect on median p-value
Regional subsidies unfavorable 0.0450 ** unfavorable 0.0565 *
ICG unfavorable 0.0783 * unfavorable 0.060 *
income favorable <2 E-6 ***
where ***, ** and * denote, respectively, signi￿cance at 1%, 5% and 10%-level.
e⁄ect of a larger share of Flemish subsidies. When local public libraries rely to a larger extent
on own resources, they are more e¢ cient (service potential is higher for a given budget).
7 Conclusion
Economic e¢ ciency ￿in terms of maximising output for a given level of inputs (e.g., Koop-
mans, 1951; Fried et al., 2008) ￿has become also an increasingly important element in public
good provision (e.g., Lindblad, 2006). From an economist point of view, this easily leads
to the question why some jurisdictions or public service providers are able to o⁄er more (or
better) services than others using an equal amount of inputs. We tackled this questions by
focussing on three issues.
Firstly, we characterised public good provision as a two-stage ￿ production￿process. A ￿rst
stage translates basic inputs (e.g., labour and capital) into service potential (e.g., opening
hours), while a second stage describes how these programmatic inputs are transformed into
observed outputs (e.g., school outcomes, library circulation). While most previous studies
do not consider this distinction in the production process, we consider the dichotomy as
crucial for making accurate inferences in e¢ ciency analyses. Indeed, the second stage outputs
(e.g., library circulation, education outputs, health outcomes) are to a large extent beyond
the control of the public service provider. Therefore, the second stage ￿nal outputs are
inappropriate to evaluate e¢ ciency of public good provision, and analyses should concentrate
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Figure 1: Partial regression plot of the e⁄ect of regional subsidies on e¢ ciency
service provider).
Secondly, to examine e¢ ciency in ￿ service potential￿ , we explored a specially tailored
and fully non-parametric framework, which is rooted in popular Data Envelopment Analysis
(DEA) models (Charnes et al., 1978). By using a robust (i.e., allowing for outlying observa-
tions; Cazals et al., 2002) and conditional (i.e., allowing for heterogeneity; Daraio and Simar,
2005,2007; De Witte and Kortelainen, 2008) e¢ ciency framework, we are able to evaluate
non-parametrically (i.e., without any a priori assumption on the production function) how
discrete and continuous exogenous variables a⁄ect observed e¢ ciency. In addition, thanks to
the conditional e¢ ciency framework we can include the operational environment immediately
in the e¢ ciency estimates. Therefore, our approach does not rely on a separability condition,
which inappropriately assumes that the exogenous environment does not have an impact on
the inputs and outputs (Simar and Wilson, 2007).
Thirdly, using the previously described insights, this paper examines how political econ-
omy factors a⁄ect e¢ ciency of local public good provision. We thereby focus on Flemish
public libraries as in Flanders local political actors have a large in￿ uence on the day-to-day
running of the library. The latter creates an attractive setting set to explore the in￿ uence of
political economy factors on productive e¢ ciency.
Our ￿ndings suggest that library e¢ ciency (i.e., e¢ ciency in the ￿rst stage of the public
good production process) is higher when (1) the ideological stance of the local government is
more left-wing, (2) the population is wealthier, (3) the area is more densely populated (i.e., the
distance to the local library is smaller) and (4) the public service revenues derive to a larger
extent from local resources. This con￿rms theoretical predictions that left-wing governments
17care more about maximising library service potential (under a given budget), interest groups
are able to push towards higher e¢ ciency and stricter monitoring (associated with higher
reliance of local resources to fund libraries) increases e¢ ciency. In addition, our results
indicate that, ceteris paribus, (5) population size, (6) the share of female representatives in the
local council, and (7) having a female mayor does not signi￿cantly a⁄ect library performances.
The latter observation contrasts to recent work on the e⁄ects of female representation on
public policy.
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